General information dispersal algorithms  by Béguin, Philippe & Cresti, Antonella
Theoretical 
Computer Science 
ELSEVIER Theoretical Computer Science 209 (1998 ) 87-t 05 
General information dispersal algorithms 
Philippe BCguin a, Antonella Cresti b,*, ’ 
a Laboratoire d’lnformatiyue, Ecole Normale SupGrieure. 75230 Paris Ckdex 05, France 
b Dipartimento di Scienze dell’Informazionr. Universitci di Roma “La Sapienza”, 00198 Roma. Italy 
Received March 1996 
Communicated by G. Ausiello 
Abstract 
We analyse the problem of distributing pieces of a file f among a set of users in such a way 
that some predefined subsets of users can, pooling together their pieces, reconstruct the entire 
file ,f. We call access structure the set of all qualified subsets and we show how to extend the 
notion of information dispersal algorithms proposed by Rabin (1989, 1990) to general access 
structures. We give bounds on the amount of information each participant must have. Then, we 
apply this results to construct optimal or near to optimal schemes for general access structures. 
Finally, we consider an application of our results to cryptography. @ 1998-Elsevier Science 
B.V. All rights reserved 
1. Introduction 
The problem of distributing pieces of a file f among a set of users in such a way 
that some predefined subsets of users can, pooling together their pieces, reconstruct the 
entire file f was first considered by Rabin [ 15, 161 that introduced the notion of infor- 
mation disperxal algorithms. His schemes are intended for the distribution of a piece 
of information among n active processors, in such a way that the recovery of the infor- 
mation is possible in presence of m active processors, where m and n are parameters 
satisfying 1 < m < n. The basic idea of his algorithms is to add to the information 
some amount of redundancy and then to partition it into n fragments, each transmitted 
to one of the parties. Reconstruction of f is possible out of m fragments. Information 
dispersal algorithms have several applications to secure and reliable storage of informa- 
tion in computer networks. Moreover they can be applied to fault-tolerant transmission 
of information and to communication between processors in parallel computers. 
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Subsequently, Preparata [14] proposed a different algorithm for information dispersal 
based on the discrete Fourier transform in which the number of operations need to 
reconstruct the file are less than in the Rabin’s algorithm. 
Naor and Roth [12] proposed an information dispersal algorithm over arbitrary 
graphs. In their model, an arbitrary file f is distributed among the nodes of the graph 
in such a way that each node of the graph, by accessing the memory of its own and 
of its adjacent nodes, can reconstruct the contents of f. Their scheme can be applied 
to store files in distributed networks. 
As the file to reconstruct should be very large, the problem is to construct efJicient 
information dispersal algorithms, that is algorithms that minimize the size of pieces 
given to each participant. An access structure on a set of users is a family of subsets 
of users which specify exactly the set of participants that must be able to recover the 
file. All above mentioned information dispersal algorithms efficiently work only for 
special access structures. 
Our objective is to find information dispersal algorithms for general access structures. 
We propose some simple techniques to distribute information between participants in 
a general access structure. First, we prove lower bounds on the size of information 
held by each user for every access structure, second we propose information dispersal 
algorithms that reach the bounds. Particularly, we describe an optimal scheme with 
respect to the average size of pieces given to participants. However, this scheme is 
applicable only for very large files (exponential in the number of parties), therefore it is 
not practical. So, the main result of the paper is a scheme that is nearly optimal for files 
of size n(n log n), which is already a reasonable size. Moreover, we apply our results 
to cryptography constructing computational secret sharing schemes that generalize the 
technique proposed by Krawczyk [9]. 
Paper organization: Section 2 gives preliminary definitions and formally introduces 
the notion of information dispersal algorithm. In Section 3 we analyse the size of frag- 
ments distributed to each user and we give some bounds on this size. Section 4 shows 
both optimal and near to optimal information dispersal algorithms for general access 
structures. Finally, in Section 5 we present an application of our result to cryptography. 
2. Definitions 
We analyse the problem of distributing pieces of a file f among a set of users in 
such a way that some predefined subsets of users can, pooling together their pieces, 
reconstruct the entire file f. 
We define information dispersal algorithms using an information-theoretical approach. 
We use Shannon entropy mainly because it leads a simple and compact description of 
the problem and because this approach considers all probability distribution on the set 
from which the file are taken. In this case we obtain bounds that holds in the general 
case, even if we propose algorithms for the simpler case of uniform distribution on 
the set of files. First, we review some notation and the definition of entropy, noting 
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that all logarithms used in this paper are of base 2. For a complete treatment of the 
subject the reader is advised to consult [5,6]. 
Given a probability distribution {~(x)},~,v on a set X, we define the entropy of X, 
H(X), as 
H(X) = - c p(x) log p(x). 
XEX 
The entropy N(X) is a measure of the average info~ation content of the elements in X 
or, equivalently, a measure of the average uncertainty one has about which element 
of the set X has been chosen when the choices of the elements from X are made 
according to the probability distribution { ~(x)},~x. The entropy enjoys the following 
property: 
0 <N(X) < log /x/, (1) 
where H(X) = 0 if and only if there exists x0 E X such that p(xo) = 1; H(X) = log 1x1 
if and only if p(x)= 1/1X1, VXEX. 
Given two sets X and Y and a joint probability distribution {~(x,Y)}~~x,~~Y on 
their Cartesian product, the conditional entropy H(XI Y), also called the equivocation 
of X given Y, is defined as 
H(XIY) = - JII x$X P(Y)P(XlY) log PHY). 
The conditional entropy can be written as H(XI Y) = C,,y p(y)H(Xl Y = y) where 
ff(Xi Y = Y) = -CxEx &I34 log h4v) can be interpreted as the average uncertainty 
one has about which element of X has been chosen when the choices are made accord- 
ing to the probability distribution {p(~ly)},~~, i.e., when it is known that the value 
chosen from the set Y is y. From the definition of conditional entropy it is easy to 
see that 
H(XjY)>O. (2) 
If we have n + 1 sets XI ,. ..,X,,, Y the entropy of XI . . .X, given Y can be written as 
H(X, . ..X.lY)=H(X,IY)$_H(&/X,Y)ir .‘. +H(X:,I& . ..X._lY). (3) 
The mutual i~fo~~at~o~ between X and Y is defined by 
f(X; Y) =H(X) - H(XIY) (4) 
and enjoys the following properties: 
f(X; Y) =Z(Y;X), (5) 
and 
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from which one gets 
H(X) > H(XI Y), (6) 
with equality if and only if X and Y are independent. 
Let P={Pi,..., P,,} be the set of participants. Denote by & C 2P the family of 
subsets of participants which we desire to be able to recover the file. The family & 
is called the access structure. It is reasonable to require that d be monotone, that is 
ifAG& andA&A’CP, then A’Ed. 
If ~2 is an access structure on 9, then BE d is a minimal authorized subset if 
A # & whenever A c B. The set of minimal authorized subsets of d is denoted do 
and is called the basis of d. d is uniquely determined as a function of do, as 
we have d = {B g 9: A C B, A E ~2~). We say that d is the closure of do and 
write d = cZ(&O). 
Let F be the set of files, {p,~(f)}f Ed be a probability distribution on F, and let 
an information dispersal algorithm for files in F be fixed. For any participant Pi E 9, 
let us denote by Gi the set of all possible fragments given to participant fi. Given 
a set of participants A = (4,). . . , fir} G 9, where il < i2 < . ’ . < i,, denote by GA the 
set Gi, X . . . x Gi,. An information dispersal algorithm for files in F and a proba- 
bility distribution { PF( f)}fE~ naturally induce a probability distribution on GA, for 
any A c 9”. Denote such probability distribution by {Po,(g)}SEoA. Finally, denote by 
H(F) = -CJEF PF(~) log PM) the entropy of {PF(~)}/EF and by H(GA) the en- 
tropy of {~G,h)h!EGA? for any A E 29. Following the information-theoretic approach, 
we define information dispersal algorithms as follows. 
Definition 2.1. Let d be an access structure on a set 9 of participants. We say that 
an algorithm Z to distribute a file in F in accordance with the probability distribution 
{p~(f)}f~~ is an information dispersal algorithm (IDA) if any qualified subset can 
reconstruct the file. Formally, for all A E ~2, it holds 
H(FIGA) = 0. 
Notice that H(F 1 GA) = -CsCG, CfEF p(f, g) log P(flg) = 0 means that each set 
of values of the fragments in GA corresponds to a unique value of the file. In fact, by 
definition, H(FIGA) = 0 is equivalent to the fact that for all g E GA with poA(g) > 0 
a unique f E F exists such that P(flg) = 1. 
The following lemma proves a lower bound on the information of participants in the 
access structure. 
Lemma 2.1. Let ST? be an access structure on a set 9’ of participants. Any informa- 
tion dispersal algorithm for &, for any A E SZZ, mast give to at least one participant 
pi E A a fragment from a domain Gj such that H(Gj) > H(F)/IAJ. 
Proof. Let A E Jie, and consider the conditional mutual information Z(GA; F). From 
(4) and (5) it follows that it can be written either as H(GA) - H(GAIF) or as 
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H(F) -H(FIGA). Hence, from (2) and from Definition 2.1 we have H(GA)=H(F)+ 
H(GAIF)> H(F). From this fact and from (3) and (6) it follows that 
C H(Gi) b H(GA). 
P, EA 
(7) 
So, one gets that there exists a participant pi in A such that H(G,) > H(F)/lA 1. 0 
2.1. A simple information dispersal algorithm 
We outline the following simple information dispersal algorithm C(m,b), where b 
is the number of parties in the system and m is the number of parties that should be 
able to reconstruct the file. Observe that in this case d = {A: IAl 2 m}. The algorithm 
described is a simple version of Rabin’s information dispersal algorithm, and it is based 
on Reed Solomon erasure codes. The information f E F to be shared is first partitioned 
into m equal parts where each part is viewed as an element over a finite field (e.g. 
GF(q), for a large enough q). These m elements are then viewed as coefficients of 
a polynomial of degree m - 1, and the b fragments for distribution are obtained by 
evaluating this polynomial in b different points (we need q 3 b). Clearly, the whole 
information can be reconstructed (by interpolation) from any m fragments. 
Assuming the uniform probability distribution over F we have H(F) = log IFI = 
m log q. Moreover, for each participant 4 E 9’ it holds H(Gi) 6 log I Gil = log q = log 
IF i/m. Observe that we have the requirement q 3 b. This implies log IFI = m log q 3 
m log b. So when the parameters m and b are big the algorithm works for large files. 
3. The size of pieces 
The efficiency of any information dispersal algorithm, is computed regarding the size 
of pieces given to each participant. So, even in the case of general access structures, 
we are interested in minimizing the size of fragments distributed to participants. 
3.1. Information reduction 
If we are interested in limiting the maximum size of fragments for each participant 
(i.e., the maximum quantity of information that must be given to any participant), then 
a worst-case measure of the maximum of H(Gi) over all Pi E 9 naturally arises. 
Definition 3.1. We define the information reduction of an information dispersal algo- 
rithm C for the access structure ~2, when the probability distribution on the set of files 
F is &, as 
e(s4, G, v = H(F) 
max{H(G,): 1 < i d n}’ 
The following theorem proves an upper bound on the information reduction above 
defined. 
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Theorem 3.1. Let S? be 
mation reduction of any 
@(-01, nF~ C) d emax, 
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an access structure on a set 9 of n participants. The infor- 
information dispersal algorithm Z for d satisJies 
where emax =min{JAl: A E do}, 
Proof. Let A E do such that IAl = emax. From Lemma 2.1, any information dispersal 
algorithm C for F must give to at least a participant Pj EA a fragment such that 
H(Gj) 2 H(F)/‘em,,. So, for any information dispersal algorithm C, max{H(Gi): 1 d i 
d n} 3 H(Gj) 2 H(F)/Q~,,. Hence, we obtain 
@cd, HF, c> = H(F) 
max{H(Gi): 1 <i <n} 
d emax, 
which proves the theorem. 0 
3.2. Average information reduction 
In many cases it is preferable to limit the sum of the size of fragments given to 
all participants. In such a cases the arithmetic mean of the size of fragments for each 
participant is a more appropriate measure. 
Definition 3.2. We define the average information reduction of an information disper- 
sal algorithm C for an access structure & when the probability distribution on the set 
of files F is U,P, as follows: 
In order to prove the existence of an upper bound on average information reduction 
consider the following linear programming problem LPI. This representation of the 
problem using a linear program was already used in the Naor and Roth’s paper [12], 
for the special case of our scenario that they considered. 
Minimize M = C:=i @i 
subject to 4 3 0, 1 <i<n 
CP,EA ai 2 1, ‘dA E do 
Let M,$,), be the solution of the linear programming problem LPI. The linear pro- 
gramming problem LPl has optimal solution in which every U’ is rational, and it can 
be expressed as pi/qi where pi and qi are natural numbers which are at most exponen- 
tial in 12. Furthermore, the known algorithms for solving linear programs, e.g. simplex 
(see [13]) and Karmarkar [7], will find such solutions. 
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The following theorem was proved by Naor and Roth [ 121 in their special case, and 
shows a relation between the size of fragments of participants and the solution I@,‘,,), 
of the linear problem. It can be applied without any changes to our scenario. When 
adapted to our notation their theorem is the following. 
Theorem 3.2 (Naor and Roth [12]). For any access structure d on a set 9 of n 
participants, and for any jile in F having entropy H(F), the size H(Gi) of fragments 
distributed to participants by any information dispersal algorithm C satishes 
M,$, . H(F) d I(B,L’F) d 5 H(Gi), 
i=l 
where I(&‘, ll~) is the integer solution to the optimization problem IPl: 
xi 2 0, Cii integer, 1 <i<n 
VAE.&O 
From Theorem 3.2 the next corollary easily follows which proves an upper bound 
on the average information reduction above defined using the optimal solution M$,l of 
the linear problem LPl. 
Corollary 3.1. Let d be an access tructure on a set 9 of n participants. The average 
information reduction of any information dispersal algorithm C for d satisfies 
4. Optimal information dispersal algorithms 
In this section we describe some “optimal” information dispersal algorithms, that is 
algorithms in which the size of fragments distributed to participants maximize the in- 
formation reduction or the average information reduction. The algorithms are obtained 
assuming the uniform probability distribution on F: hence H(F) = log IFI. For simplic- 
ity, we denote the information reduction and the average information reduction of an 
information dispersal algorithm Z for an access structure d respectively with Q(.G?, C) 
and Q(Jz?, C) omitting the uniform probability distribution on F. 
Let d be an access structure on a set 9 of n participants. For all fi E 9, let pi, gi 
be some positive integers such that 
(8) 
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Let m be the least common multiple of ql, . . . , qn, let xi = pi/qi, for 1 d i<n, and let 
b = cy!, m . (pi/qi). We assume the information dispersal algorithm Z(m, b) described 
in Section 2 which works for parameters b (number of file fragments) and m (number 
of required fragments to reconstruct the file). We explain later how to choose the 
values Xi, for 1 <i <n, in order to optimize the information reduction or the average 
information reduction of the scheme. 
Distribution scheme 
l Using Z(m, b) partition the file f E F into b fragments, fi,. . . , fb. 
l Assign to each participant Pi, m ‘xi distinct fragments f/“, . . . , fz!,, in such 
a way that no two participants get the same fragment (this is always possible since 
Cy=, m .xi is equal to b, the number of available fragments). 
The fragment of each participant fi consists on gi = (f:“, . . . , fz?,), for 1 6 i <II. 
Reconstruction scheme 
l Each set of participants A in the access structure collect their fragments. 
l Using C(m, b) reconstruct f out of the collected values. 
Proposition 4.1. The above scheme constitutes an informational dispersal algorithm 
for the access structure d. 
Proof. For all A E ._&, condition (8) of Lemma 2.1 implies CPaEA m . Xi >m. This means 
that the participants in A, pooling together their fragments, have at least m out of 
fragments f 1, . . . , fb, From this fact, and from the properties of the algorithm C(m, b) 
derives the feasibility for a set of participants A to reconstruct the file f out of the 
fragments. 0 
4.1. How to optimize the information reduction 
We now show how to choose the values xi, for 16 i <n, in order to maximize the 
information reduction. We propose three techniques. All of them are optimal as they 
reach the upper bound proved in Section 3. The algorithm obtained applying the first 
technique is useful even for distribute small files. The other techniques are better than 
the first, but they works only on large files. Moreover, the algorithm obtained applying 
the third technique gives to participants fragments no longer than necessary. 
First technique: We propose the following simple method to choose the values 
xi = pi/qi, for all 1 < i <n. For all participants Pi E 8, let be pi = 1, and qi = emax = min 
{ IAl: A E do}. The following theorem proves that the technique is correct and that the 
algorithm obtained choosing the values xi as suggested is optimal. 
Theorem 4.1. The above xi satisfies condition (8). Moreover, the information disper- 
sal algorithm Cl obtained taking these values maximizes the information reduction, 
that is ~(d, Z,) = emax. 
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Proof. Let A E do. For all P, EA, there holds qi < IA /. Hence, 
So each xi satisfies equality (8). 
Moreover, each participant receives a fragment of size log IFI/Q~~~. So, Q(&‘, &) 3 
e max ? and it follows that with this algorithm we obtain optimal information reduc- 
tion. 0 
As we observe in Section 2 the simple information dispersal algorithm C(m,b) has 
the requirement log (PI = m log q b m log b. So when the parameters m and b are big 
our algorithms work only for large files. Moreover, we will see that for special access 
structures m and b could be exponentially big in n. The constraint on the file’s size 
applied to algorithm Ct becomes log IFI > emax log n. So, as emax satisfies emax <n, the 
algorithm Cl is useful even for small files. 
Second technique: When the rank of the access structure is not constant, the scheme 
Ct is not the most “efficient” as it gives to each participant a fragment with the 
same length. If we wish to distribute large files, then we describe an algorithm more 
“efficient” than Ct that gives to some participant fragments shorter than 
log IFI l@nl,X~ 
For all participants P E 9, let be Pi = 1, and qi = min{ IA I: A E do and Pi EA}. The 
following theorem proves that the technique is correct and that the algorithm obtained 
choosing the values xi as suggested is optimal. 
Theorem 4.2. The above xi satisjies condition (8). Moreover, the information disper- 
sal algorithm C2 obtained taking these values maximizes the information reduction, 
i.e.. e( d, CI ) = emax. 
Proof. Let A E do. For all pl EA, there holds qi d IAl. Hence, 
So each xi satisfies equality (8). 
To prove that the scheme & reaches the bound on information reduction, observe 
that each participant Pi receives m/qi fragments, each of size log IFIlm. Moreover, 
for all l<i<n, qi=min{IAl: AE&” and PiEA}>min{lAl: AEZZZ~}=Q,,,~~. So, for 
1 <i<n it holds that 
log IFl m log IFI 1% IFI logIGil=-. -=-----<----. 
m qi 4i @max 
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As H( Gi) 6 log 1 Gi 1 and H(F) = log(F), then 
H(F) 
H(Gi)<-. 
emax 
Then max{H(Gi): 1 <idn}dH(F)/~~,,, so ~(d,Zl)2~,,,,~. From Theorem 3.1 the 
equality follows. 0 
Third technique: The third technique we propose provides an information dispersal 
algorithm with maximal average information reduction among the schemes with max- 
imal information reduction: the algorithm reaches the bound on information reduction 
and gives to participants fragments no longer than necessary. Even this technique works 
when we want to distribute large files. The values xi, for 16 i <n, should be found 
solving the following linear programming problem called LP2. 
Minimize A4 = CIZt Pi 
1 subject to 0 <fii < l/emax, 
Let A4$: = EYE, &? be the solution to the linear programming problem LP2. Each 
p*, for 1 <i <n is rational and we can express it as a fractio /IT = Pi/qi, where Pi and 
qi are natural numbers. The following theorem holds. 
Theorem 4.3. The above /3* satisfies Eq. (8). Moreover, the information dispersal al- 
gorithm Z3 obtained taking xi = @, for 1 <i <n, maximizes the information reduct- 
ion, that is Q(Jz!‘, &) = emax. 
Proof. From definition of @, for all A E ,QI”, CP,EA /?,* 3 1, so equality (8) is satisfied. 
To prove that the scheme Cs reaches the bound on information reduction, observe that 
each participant Pi receives m . /3,? fragments, each of size log IFl/m. So, for 1 <id n 
it holds that 
Then, 
H(F) H(Gi) < -. 
emax 
So, max{H(Gi): 1 <idn} <H(F)/emax, hence Q(-G~,C~)~Q~~~. From Theorem 3.1 the 
equality follows. 0 
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In this way, the sum of fragments distributed to participants is minimized, while all 
fragments are less than log \t;\/emax. 
4.2. How to optimize the average information reduction 
The linear optimization problem LPl described in Section 3 will be used to maximize 
the average information reduction. We restate the problem for clarity. 
Minimize M= xi”=, ai 
subject to xi 3 0, 1 =$i<n 
CfiE~ Zj 3 1, Vi4 fSjfc 
Let M,$ = C:=, c$ be the solution to the linear programming problem LPI. As each 
z*, for 1 G i d n, is rational we can express it as a fractio a,! = pi/q;. The following 
theorem holds. 
Theorem 4.4. The above zf satisfies Eq (8). moreover, the information dispersal 
algorithm .X4 obtained taking xi = ~7, for 1 <i < n, maximizes the average information 
reduction, that is @(XI, Z,) = n/M,$A. 
Proof. From definition of MT, for all A f do, x P l A C$ 3 1, so equality (8) is satisfied. 
To prove that the scheme C4 reaches the bbund on info~ation reduction, ob- 
serve that each participant P, receives m .c$ fragments, each of size log iFl/rn. So, 
for 1 bi<n it holds that 
log/Gi,~log 
m 
.rn+l;lr =H(F).x,*. 
Then 
From Theorem 3.1 the equality follows. 0 
4.3. Com~~ri.~on of the te~~lni~~es 
Observe that the solution hJ,.$A to the optimization problem LP2 is, in general, bigger 
than the solution IV:,), to the problem LPI in which the fragments may be bigger than 
log Hl@nl,X. The following example shows that the four previous schemes do not give, 
in general, the same result. 
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Let 8={Pt,...&}, and let be do = { {Pt,&}, {P~,Ps,P!), {Pz,P&}} the basis 
of the access structure d on 9”. In the next table we present for the four schemes 
Cl, &, Z3, and Cd the following values in order to outline the differences between 
the techniques: the value xi = log IGil/lOg IFI, f or each 1 gi <6, the value Q, and the 
value 4. 
63 
I 
f 
I 0 1 3 I I 0 2 3 
x4 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 6 
4.4. A “bad” access structure 
As we observed in Section 2 that the simple info~ation dispersal algo~thm C(pn, b) 
has the requirement log IFI = m log q 2 m log b. So when the parameters m and b are 
big the algorithm works only for large files. 
We now describe an access structure which proves that effectively the parameters 
m and b for the information dispersal algorithms described above can be very large. 
This implies that, in such situations, our schemes &, Es, and & can be used only for 
sufficiently large files. 
Let PI,. . . , pk be the first k prime numbers (p, = 2, PZ = 3,.. .). Let the set of 
participants be 9 = $9’1 U s s . Ui!$, where z&Pi!?$=0, for i#jclj, and ICYl=Pi+l for all 
ial. Let Yi={Pj,r, . . . ,F’Q~+~ }. Let the basis of the access structure be the following: 
do = 6 {A: A 2 9, /A] = pi} 
i=l 
k-l 
U ,v, {A’JB: AC%> BCfi+l, - IAI=pi-l, Isl=Pi+~-pi+l}, 
The value emax = min{ [A 1: A f do} in this case is equal to pt = 2, so the optimization 
problems LPI and LP2 for this access structure become, respectively, 
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and 
Clearly, the second technique described in Section 4 gives the values xi,, = l/Pi, 
for all 16 i < k, and for all 1 <j < Pi + 1 when applied to the above described access 
structure. Next theorem states that the solutions to the optimization problems LPl and 
LP2 are unique, and they are obtained by the same values. 
Theorem 4.5. The only optimal solution to the optimization problems LPl and LP2 
described above is attained by 
for l<i<k andfor ldj<Pi+l 
Proof. We make use of the following lemma. 
Lemma 4.1. [f n rational values xl,. . . , x, must satisfy the constraint CiEA Xi > 1, for 
all Ac{l,..., n} such that (Al = n - 1, then 
n n 
CXi2- 
I=1 n- 1’ 
(9) 
and the equality holds if and only if xi = l/(n - 1) fbr all 1 <i <n. 
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Let A 1,. . . ,A, be the n subsets of { 1,. . . , n} having cardinality 
n - 1, i.e. Aj = { 1,. . . ,n}\{ j}. For all j, ziEA Xi 2 1. SO, xi”=, CiEA, Xi an. Hence, it 
holds that C:=, Xi JAi I> n. Then, xi”=, xi 2 5 .‘Equality holds if and only if all inequal- 
ities above are equalities, that is C:=, xi = 2 if and only if, for all j, CiEA, xi = 1. 
SO, we obtain Xj = xi”=, Xi - CiEA, xi = 5 - 1 = A. This implies that equality holds 
if and only if xi = l/(n - l), for all 1 di<n. 0 
Proof of Theorem 4.5. We first consider the solution to the optimization problem LPl. 
According to the previous lemma, we must have, for any solution to the problem, and 
for all 1 <i<k, 
(10) 
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where the equality holds if and only if CXQ = I/Pi for all 1 <<i <k and 1 <j < pi + 1. 
This solution satisfies all constraints for the access structure &“. In fact, if A c Pi such 
that IAl = pi, then CP,eA Ei,j = PiI’Pi = 1. Moreover, if A C Yi and B C *pi+1 such that 
JAI = Pi - 1 and IBl = pii-1 - Pi + 1 then, 
This solution satisfies the equality in (10). So, the optimal solution of LPl must satisfy 
the equality in (10). Then, the only optimal solution to the optimization problem LPl 
is a,Tj= l/Pi for all 1 <igk and 1 <j<Pi + 1. 
The proof for the optimization problem LP2 is similar. 0 
From these facts it follows that for the access structure d the previously described 
algorithms .Zz, Cs, and C4 give the same values Xf,j = l/pi, for all 1 < i 6 k, and for 
all 1 <j < Pi + 1. Then, it holds that n = k + cF=, pi, and m = @=, pi. SO, 
k 
n=k+i:piVCilni-k21nk,2, 
i=l i=l 
and 
m= fi pi>k!. 
i=l 
This implies that the ratio m/n is exponential in k and in n. As algorithms &, Cf, 
and & require that log IFI &m log b, we conclude that they realize an info~ation 
dispersal algorithm for the access structure d only if the files that participants want to 
reconstruct are very large. So, when the file to distribute is small, in order to maximize 
the information reduction we have to use algorithm Zi. 
4.5. iodized schemes 
We propose now an information dispersal algorithms which work even for small files 
and which nearly reach the upper bound on the average information reduction proved 
in Section 3. The algorithm has been obtained by simply adapting the algorithm Cd in 
order to handle the case of small files. It gives an average information reduction close 
to optimum. Suppose we have found the razios a,? and A4$: solving the optimization 
problem LPl. Moreover, suppose IFI ‘in > @42! + 1). Let k be the biggest integer such 
that IPI In,” ‘ikn > knM(” + n, and let b = EyZ, ICY_* .k-nj. Use in the distribution scheme 
for Cs an information dispersal algorithm with parameters (kvn,b). We give to the 
i-th participant [a*?. k-n1 distinct fragments. Observe that b6 knM,$~ + n < IF[likn, so 
log (Fl >kn log 6. Then, the simple algorithm of Section 2 applies. 
Now we give a bound on the average info~ation reduction of the algorithm. The 
following relation holds: 
(y (c&kn + 1)) = (Mz,ia + $) log/F/. 
I’. B&in, A. Crestii Theoretical Computer Science 209 (1998) 87-105 101 
Hence, from Theorem 3.2 
It follows that with this algorithm we obtain an average information reduction nearly 
optimal. Moreover, the constraint on the file size is lFI”’ >n(M,$A + l), that is log ]FI 
3 n log(n(MtiA + 1 )), and @,]A satisfies A4,$h <n. So, the algorithm Cs is useful even 
for small files, i.e. of size 0(n log 12). 
5. Applications to secret sharing schemes 
Secret sharing is an important tool in security and cryptography. An important issue 
in secret sharing theory is the size of the shares distributed, since the security of a sys- 
tem degrades as the amount of information that must be kept secret increases. A very 
strong requirement is that all qualified subsets of participants can reconstruct the secret 
but all other subsets obtain no information (in an information-theoretic sense) about 
the secret. These schemes are called perfect secret sharing schemes. Unfortunately, in 
this case the size of the shares cannot be less than the size of the secret. However, the 
proof of this lower bound uses the notion of information secrecy. 
A natural question is whether one can do better for secret sharing if the notion 
of secrecy is computational, namely, against resource bounded adversaries: i.e. any 
qualified subset can reconstruct the secret but any other subset obtains no computational 
information about the secret. These schemes are called computational secret sharing 
schemes. 
Kurosawa et al. [lo, 1 l] presented an approach of non-perfect secret sharing schemes 
in term of information theory and matroids. Subsequently, Krawczyk [9] proposed 
a non-perfect m-threshold scheme, where m shares recover the secret but m - 1 shares 
give no (computational) information on the secret, in which shares corresponding to 
a secret set S are of size log Isl/rn (where IS/ denotes the cardinality of the set S) plus 
a short piece of information whose length does not depend on the secret size but just 
on the security parameter. 
The scheme of Krawczyk is very simple and combines in a natural way traditional 
(perfect) secret sharing schemes, encryption, and known information dispersal algo- 
rithms. It is provable secure given a secure (private key) encryption function. 
A natural question is whether the space efficiency can be carried over more general 
access structures than just threshold schemes: one of the problems was to find an 
information dispersal algorithm for general access structures. 
In this section we use the information dispersal algorithms described in previous 
sections to construct short secret sharing schemes for general access structures. The 
scheme is a simple generalization of Krawczyk’s one. 
Given an access structure d, on a set Y = {PI,. . . ,P,} of participants, let K be 
the space of keys, and let {A (k)} kEK be a probability distribution on K. Let a secret 
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sharing scheme for secrets in K be fixed. For any participant s E 9, let us denote 
by L$ the set of all possible shares given to participant l$. Given a set of partici- 
pants A = (4,). . . , &}&9,whereil<i2<...<i,, denote by G the set 6, x ... x Kr. 
A secret sharing scheme for secrets in K and probability distribution { pK(k)}kE~ nat- 
urally induce a probability distribution on &,, for any A C 9. Denote such probability 
distribution by {pi, (u)},~G . Finally, denote by H(K) the entropy of {pK(k)}kE~ and 
by H(G) the entropy of {~~(Lz)}~~~, for any A ~2~. 
Following the information-theoretical approach of [S, 31 we say that a secret sharing 
scheme is a perfect secret sharing scheme for the access structure d if 
1. Any qualified subset can reconstruct he secret: 
Formally, for all A E d, it holds H(KI &) = 0. 
2. Any non-qualified subset has absolutely no information on the secret: 
Formally, for all A $! &‘, it holds H(K I&) = H(K). 
We assume a perfect secret sharing scheme PSS for the access structure d and 
an information dispersal algorithm IDA for the same access structure. We can choose 
the information dispersal algorithm IDA between those described in previous sections 
according to which information reduction we want to optimize. Also assume a secure 
(length preserving) private key encryption function, denoted ENC. The space of secrets 
S in our schemes is the same as the space of messages E for the encryption function 
ENC. For each participant e E 9’ we denote by Gi the set of possible fragments given 
to participant fi with IDA, and by K the set of possible shares given to participant 
fl with PSS. Moreover, we denote by V$ = Gi x I$ the set of possible shares given to 
participant 4 in the scheme SS which we are going to describe. We consider uniform 
probability distributions both over S and over K. 
Distribution Scheme of SS: 
l Chose a random encryption key k E K. Encrypt the secret s E S using the encryption 
function ENC under the key k, let f = ENCk(s). 
l Using IDA partition the encrypted file f into n fragments, 91,. . . , gn, and distribute 
them to the participants in d. 
l Using PSS generate n shares for the key k, denoted VI, . . . ,v,, and distribute them 
to the participants in d. 
The share of each participant 4, 1 <i <n consists in wi = (gi, Vi). 
Reconstruction Scheme of SS: 
l Each set of participants A in the access structure collect their shares. 
l Using IDA reconstruct f out of the collected values gi for all q E A. 
l Using PSS recover the key k out of ai for all fi E A. 
l Decrypt f using k to recover the secret s. 
The following theorem shows that the above scheme is a computational secret sharing 
scheme. 
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Theorem 5.1. The above scheme SS constitutes a computationally secure secret shar- 
ing scheme for the access structure d provided that ENC is a secure encryption 
function and PSS a perfect secret sharing scheme. 
Proof. The feasibility for a set of participants A to reconstruct the encrypted secret f 
out of the fragments is inherited from the properties of the algorithm IDA. Also the 
reconstruction of the key k out of ui for all fl E A is guaranteed by the secret sharing 
scheme PSS. Knowing f and k it is possible to derive s using the decryption function 
for each set of participants in the access structure d. 
As for the secrecy against a coalition of participants B not belonging to the access 
structure, the intuitive idea is the following. The fragments corresponding to f of all 
participants in B give no information on s than f itself. On the other hand, the key- 
shares given them give no information at all on k, therefore knowing f cannot help 
to learn something about s. 0 
5.1. The size of shares 
The length of each share for 1 <i <n, is log 1 FF$/ = log IGil + log ] I$. So, the length 
of the shares depends both on the information dispersal algorithm and on the perfect 
secret sharing scheme used to construct the scheme. Depending on what information 
dispersal algorithm we choose, the size of Gi is minimal for the corresponding defini- 
tion. And the size of fi does not depend on the secret size but only on the security 
parameter. However, observe that for general access structures the size log I f$l of shares 
of perfect secret sharing schemes used in order to share the encyphering key k may be 
exponentially large respect to the size of the secret key log IKI: an upper bound better 
than exponential is not known for the length of shares in the general case. Moreover, 
Csirmaz [4] proved that there are access structures for which the shares given to par- 
ticipants in any perfect secret sharing scheme grow as n/logn where n is the number 
of participants in the access structure. 
We have better upper bounds in the case the access structure is based on graphs. If, 
for example, the graph on which the access structure is based is complete multipartite, 
then there exists an ideal perfect secret sharing scheme for d (see [2]) and the size 
of the shares become log ISI/Q,~ + log ]K]. Otherwise, using bounds found in [17] we 
can say that log / El d log IKl(d + 1)/2, where A is the maximum degree of de graph. 
Moreover, better bounds on K can be obtained if the graph is acyclic [l]. 
We remark that the size of the shares that must be kept secret is an important issue: 
in many cases such shares must be kept in mind or in tamper-resistant devices, so they 
must be very small. In our schemes, only E must be secret, while the piece Gi could be 
saved in a hard disk or in a floppy disk. Moreover, the size of the K does not depend 
on the size of the secret file. Hence for very long files our schemes are very useful. 
Finally, observe that computational schemes are not weaker than perfect ones in prac- 
tical viewpoint since most of the time people uses an encryption function to distribute 
the shares or a pseudo-random generator to produce them. 
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6. Conclusions 
We have shown how to realize information dispersal algorithms for general access 
structures. Using an information-theoretic based definition, we proved some bounds on 
the size of fragments that must be distributed to participants in the scheme. Moreover, 
we showed optimal or near to optimal information dispersal algorithms. 
Finally, we showed a possible application of described algorithms to cryptography, 
in order to construct computational secret sharing schemes. Maybe, other applications 
of our schemes could be found in the field of distributed systems. 
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